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Christian tradition being a characteristic basic feature of Cuban culture, the 
more startling the fact is that Cuba is the only Latin-American country of our day 
where Christmas is not a holiday. In 1969 the greatest feast of Christianity was 
expelled from the official holiday calender on state initiatives with the involuntary 
consent of Church leaders.Although not disappearing from Cuban society Christ-
mas retired to private life in family houses and among church walls. 
The government justified the ban and the feast's subsequent shift to New Year 
by referring to the vital importance of unbroken continuity of work during the 
zafra, the sugar-producing period of the year. The national campaign for achieving 
10 million tons of sugar per year went on in the late 60ies. The lack of any con-
siderable opposition in society against expelling Christmas and pressing it back to 
private life throws a characteristical light on the artificially heightened producing-
-enthusiasm of the time and on Cuban religiousness as well. 
Perhaps the story of Cuban Christmas can have a symbolic meaning just be-
cause it contains these references to the anomalies of Cuban religiousness. It 
mirrors equally the weakness and marginal position of the Church and the indif-
ference or at least an aversion to institutionalized religion on the side of the 
population. 
Experts agree that today Cuba is the least religious country in Latin-America; 
a country where the Churches including Roman Catholicism with her vast his-
torical tradition have only a modest social influence. 
Opinion prevails that this is the direct consequence of the 1959 revolution: 
Castro's church policy with the dominancy of Marxism and the official ideology of 
atheism have been responsible and can be blamed for the marginal position of the 
Church. This explanation seems to be evident, is nicely rounded and even gives 
opportunity to draw East-European parallels but a deeper insight into the history 
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of Cuban Catholicism reveals its incompleteness. 
The Church had been loosing ground in Cuban society long before the Revo-
lution, as early as the period of national awakening and fighting for independence 
in the second half of the 19th century. From the very beginning the social challen-
ges of 20ieth century Cuba proved to be unanswerable or only partly answerable 
for the Roman Catholic Church. The history slowly building up of these answers 
can be inerpreted as a long and painful peregrination (not without digressions) to 
find a characteristic voice, an individual face, an authentic role in society. Parado-
xically enough Cuban Church has arrived to the desired self-identification in our 
days. The documents of Cuban National Church Encounter £Encuentro Nacional 
Eclesial Cubano, fisher: ENEC) in 1986 are evidences of the renewal.1 
In the early 20ieth centuiy period of transition from colonial to republican era 
the majority of the" Cubans thought the Church an alien, obsolete and anti-Cuban 
force, The masculine part of the population thought religion fit for women and 
children only and did not even attend Mass. The 19th century social and economi-
cal processes played an important role in the formation of irreligiousness and an-
ticlericalism and even more important was the conflict developing from the middle 
third of the century between the Cubans' gradual awakening to national concious-
ness and the Catholic Church representing Spanish colonial interests. 
No matter how strange it may sound, the first losses of the Church were* 
caused by the 19th century great economic change towards the dominance of a 
sugar plantation economics, based on slave labour. Sugar transformed Cuban 
society. Slaves in huge waves were transported to the Island; around 1873 their 
number mounted-already about half a million. The Church could not meet the 
requirements of the challenge embodied in the problems of Christianizing the 
slaves and assimilating them in the standards of colonial Catholicism. The slave 
learned some catechism and got baptized compelled by his master who was obli-
ged to do so by the law under penalty of excommunication. But the slave did not 
1 See: Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano. Documento Final e Instrucción de los Obispos - further: 
ENEC. Don Bosco, Roma, 1987 
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turn into a true Christian. Under the thin polish of superficial Catholicism ele-
ments of African cultures and religions lived on and got new fresh impulses from 
the endless slave transports. Keeping and saving African identity meant protesting 
against submission and in a certain sense it can be called the ideology of revolt. 
All what Catholicism could achieve was the gradual penetration of Christian 
teaching into African religiousness, a fusion resulting in special syncretic cults like 
the santería. 
In all probability the syncretic cults were already present in the popular ideo-
logies of last century's struggles for independence. At least there is the fact that 60 
percent of the mambí soldiers of the 1895-98 Liberation War came from coloured 
people, and a great number of them had been fighting already in the Ten Years 
War (1868-1878).2 
In the 20ieth century religious syncretism influenced strongly the poorer strata 
of the white population as well especially in the slums of the big cities and in the 
backward parts of the country (e.g. Oriente). 
The Catholic Church had refused, to take notice for a very long time of the 
wide currency and spread of the syncretic cults and regarded them condemnable 
superstitions. The 1986 National Church Encounter brought about a change in 
judgement. The Final Document of the ENEC admits that the religiousness of the 
majority of Cuban population may be connected with the syncretic cults. Accord-
ing to the Document, this religiousness is dispersing on a wide scale. As one ex-
treme, the variants of spiritualism and African animism are in touch with Catholi-
cism only slightly and superficially. Popular Catholicism hued by African beliefs 
signifies the other end.3 
The identity crisis of 19th century Church led to the unpopularity of Church in 
the early 20ieth century. From the middle third of the 19th century the Clergy 
turned against the developing Cuban national consciousness, turned down the 
thought of independence, and identified itself with the interests of the Spanish 
2 Poumier, María: Apuntes sobre la vida cotidiana en Cuba en 1898. Ed. Ciencias Sociales, La 
Habana, 1975, p. 62. 
3 ENEC, p. 80. 
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Crown. This behaviour was the logical consequence of the Spanish policy. Having 
lost almost all the American colonies in the early 19th century, the Spanish state 
made enormous efforts to keep Cuba, to supress the independence movement and ' 
by applicating the Right of patronage made the Church an obedient servant. 
During the course of the 19th century the rehispanisation of Cuban Church was 
carried out.4 The Chairs of the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba and the Bishop of 
Habana were given exclusively to Spaniards from the home country and even the 
lesser church dignities fell victims to the invasion of clerics from Spain. 
Data clearly reflect that as a result Cubans were abandoning Church career. A 
faint glow of the 18th century golden age of Church still lingered in 1817 when 
1044 priests and clerics took care of the spiritual welfare of a population counting 
half a million people. By 1857 this total nearly reached one million while the 
number of clergy lessened to 438.5 The decrease was partly due to certain anti-
clerical measures of Spanish liberalism e.g. the secularization of monastic proper-
ties in the early 1840ies.6 But the tendency of decrease went on during the colonial 
era. When the independence of the country was declared the total number of 
priests and clerics in Cuba was hovering around 300 (exact data are not known).7 
According to the ENEC Document, this was a painful period of decline and 
decadence marked by the impoverishment and bad administration of a grieviously 
manipulated Church, by the disintegration of spiritual welfare services and by the 
moral decline of the clergy.8 
In the Ten Years War (1868-1878) and in the Liberation War (1895-1898) the 
Church physically disappeared from many parts of the country. The fighting parties 
4 ENEC, p. 37. 
5 Prien, Hans-Jürgen: La historia del cristianismo en América Latina, Salamanca, 1985, pp. 961-962. 
6 Leiseca, Juan Martín: Apuntes para la Historia Eclesiástica de Cuba, Carasa y Ca., La Habana, 
1938 pp. 152-156. 
7 José Luciano Franco said in interview, that there were only 7-8 Cuban-born priests in a total of 2-300. 
See: Poumier op. cit. p. 186. 
8 ENEC, p. 37. 
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often used occupied church buildings as hospitals or barracks and almost as often 
set them on fire to prevent the enemy from using them. 
There were several priests of Cuban origins who supported the claim for 
independence. When the 1868 revolution broke out the Spanish military authori-
ties arrested six priests including 82 years old Father Pedro Nolasco Alberre 
charged with conspiracy and sent them into exile. Parish priest Francisco Esquem-
bre from Cumanayagua was shot on suspicion of betrayal. Others like Father 
Braulio Odio from Santiago de Cuba followed their flock to the war and worked 
as army chaplains in the mambí army.9 
But a priest sympathizing or even co-operating with the forces of indepen-
dence was a rare exception of the period. Cubans have in mind more lasting me-
mories of the Church working against revolution and independence and singing 
thanksgiving Te Deum in churches when the death of José Martí, Antonio Maceo 
and other independence leaders were announced.10 
The ENEC Document tells that at the beginning of the republican era the 
Church faced the greatest danger and challenge in the irreligiousness of the mas-
ses, in anticlericalism, in the lack of religious culture and in indifference.11 The 
termination of colonial rule caused a radical alteration in the position of the Ca-
tholic Church and created a new situation. A crisis in Church authority was ahead 
because the two prelates and the Spanish priests and clerics left the island in com-
pany with the Spanish soldiers. 
Between 1898-1902 i.e. in the period of the first USA occupation of Cuba the 
American military government executed the separation of State and Church and 
declared liberty of religion and conscience. This concept was codified by the 1901 
Constitution of the republic created under heavy American patronage. The prin-
ciple of the separation of State and Church is present in later constitutions as well: 
9 Leiseca, op. cit. p. 186. and 188. 
10 See: Kirk, John M.: 'Ante el Volcán. La Iglesia en la Cuba prerevolucionaria'. Revista Latinoamer-
icana de Teología, UCA, San Salvador, Año V. No. 13. (1988), p. 69. 
11 ENEC, p. 39. 
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- the progressive 1940 Constitution and the 1976 Constitution of socialist Cuba also 
contain it.12 
In the years of first occupation the USA military government reorganized 
education and health service. The educational monopoly of Church was put to an 
end and nuns and monks were removed from public education. As a part of the 
reform secular education was declared and religious instruction was forbidden in 
state schools. Though from the 1930ies the Church protested against it several 
times this decree stayed in force in the whole period of the "neocolonial republic". 
Religious school instruction was given only in private schools. 
Establishing the republic more liberal reforms were codified. Civil marriage 
and civil registration likewise the termination of the Church's right of disposal 
over cemeteries can be mentioned. These measures caused further decline in the 
low enough prestige of the Church and resulted financial losses as well. 
So the Catholic Church has lost the old privileges of the colonial era and, 
moreover, her religious monopoly got to an end. The USA authorities openly 
supported the entering of Protestant Churches and sects. The 1943 census men-
tions already 20 Protestant denominations.13 Nowadays there are more than 50.14 
In the 1950ies their congregation was estimated 200.000 people. Nowadays the 
number of the active Protestants in Cuba is estimated a couple of ten thousands. 
At the beginning of the republican era the problem of economic independence 
was a special case for the Church. In the last century of the colonial era the 
Church was not independent economically, her possessions and estates were under 
Spanish Crown control, her functioning depended on government subventions and 
private donations. 
12 See: Pichardo, Hortensia: Documentos para la Historia de Cuba. Vol. II., La Habana, 1979, p. 79.; 
Nueva Constitución de la República de Cuba. Luz-Hilo, 1940, p. 37.; Constitución de la República 
de Cuba. Ed. Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria del CC del PCC. La Habana, 1976, pp. 
38-39. 
13 República de Cuba. Censo del año 1943. P. Fernandez y Cía. Habana, pp. 330-331. 
14 González, Doria: Iglesias y Creyentes en Cuba Socialista. Ed. Cultura Popular. La Habana, 1987, pp. 
16-18. 
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The Act declaring the separation of State and Church prohibited government-
subvention of the Churches. Theoretically the Catholic Church had to become 
self-supporting from her own incomes. This need gave a definite answer to the 
question of primacy in re-conquering the different strata of society and printed out 
the necessary direction of social orientation. Practically government subvention did 
not stop completely. The Church was regularly alloted donations not indicated in 
state budget. As another form of support the Cuban state undertook the obliga-
tions of the Spanish State and indemnified for the Church properties secularized 
in the 19th century liberal era. This case had been started by the American mili-
tary government, the properties had been evaluated 2 million dollars and the 
Cubans payed with government securities yielding 5 percent a year.15 
As a summary we can conclude that the early 20ieth century demanded from 
the Church a start towards transforming herself into a national institution. 
The Church answered the social challenges of the new period with a com-
prehensive reorganisation characterized by turning towards Rome (romanización) 
and - at least at the beginning - by striving to cubanize the Church. In this process 
the Vatican established six dioceses between 1903 and 1912 in the place of the 
colonial two (i.e. the Archbishopric of Santiago de Cuba and the Bishopric of 
Habana). So a church district system corresponding with the state administration 
scheme was developed and stabilized. The last diocese of our time around Hol-
guin was established by the Vatican not earlier than 1979. In 1903 Pinar del Rio 
and Cienfuegos, in 1912 Camagüey and Matanzas were established. The impor-
tance of the Habana diocese was ackowledged in 1925 when Pope Pius XI. gave it 
the rank of Archbishopric.16 The reorganization brought about the appointment of 
Cuban-bora priests to higher church dignities even Bishoprics in the early times of 
the republic. 
In 1912 in spite of the slow return of Spanish clerics and the settling down of 
some USA resident orders the total number of priests and monks was not more 
15 Historia de Cuba. Ed. Dirección Política de las F. A. R. La Habana, 1968, pp. 522-523. 
16 ENEC, p. 39.; Leiseca, op. cit. p. 208, 212, 253. 
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than 371 in Cuba.17 The lack of priests and the demand to strengthen the national 
character urged the Church to try to make church career more attractive and to 
extend the training of priests. This attempt brought only very modest success and 
as for strengthening the national character of the Church it was in fact a failure. 
As late as 1955 only 133 seminarists came from a population mounting already to 
six million.18 The Church had been filling the gap with "Spanish import". As a 
consequence by the fifties Cuban Catholic Church was scarcely more than a "mi-
ssionary outpost of Spain" as Margaret E. Crahan calls it.19 More than 80 percent 
of her staff consisted of Spaniards. The report of the Cuban bishops to the first, 
1955 conference of the CELAM (Latin American Bishopic Conference) contains 
more detailed data. According to the document, out of 220 parish priests only 95 
were Cuban; out of 461 ordained monks only 30. Female orders, sisterhoods had 
1872 members with 556 Cuban nuns in them. The majority of 329 monks not 
ordained was foreigner as well.20 
This structure alone prevented the Church from perceiving the country's social 
tensions in their true dimensions and made her identification with the people's 
interests weak and poor. We must not forget the fact stressed by John M. Kirk 
that the majority of these Spanish priests had been educated in Franco's Spain and 
had a world view based on the refusal of any kind of leftist thinking. In certain 
cases even a sympathy with the Falangist movement could be discerned. The 
conservatism of their education and thinking manifested itself in the conflict of 
Church and Revolution after 1959.21 
17 Stimme der Stimmlosen.. Dokumente zum Sozialen Engagement katholischer Christen in Lateiname-
rika. Ed. by Kersten Radzimanowski, Union Verlag, Berlin, 1983, p. 246. 
18 Treto, Raúl Gómez: La Iglesia Católica durante la Construcción del Socialismo en Cuba. 
(CEHILA), Matanzas, Cuba, 1988, p. 20. 
19 Crahan, Margaret E.: 'Cuba: Religion and Revolutionary Institutionalization'. Journal of Latin 
American Studies, Vol. 17., Part. 2., Nov. 1985, p. 319. 
20 Quoted by Treto op. cit. p. 20. . 
21 Kirk op. cit. p. 74. 
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The outlines of the Catholic strategy to win the flock back became distinct by 
the 1920ies, 1930ies. The Church aimed her activities mainly at the upper class 
bourgoisie and the urban middle class, and brought less care to bear upon winning 
the lower strata of society, the industrial and agricultural workers. Big cities be-
came the main fields of work, 85 percent of Church staff concentrated in Habana. 
Vast territories were left unprovided in the country, especially in the backward. 
parts like the large provinces Las Villas and Oriente. In the lengthy interview 
given to Frei Betto, Fidel Castro remembers his childhood in Oriente and men-
tions that they had seen priests very rarely, only once a year when the time of 
baptizing set in.22 In the country Church presence could be felt only in those 
districts where the small colonial food or tabacco farmsteads had been surviving. 
Such traditional sphere of the Church was e.g. Pinar del Rio and the major part of 
the province of Habana. But on the great sugar plantations which dominated the 
economics of the country the Church was not present for the most part. The 
latifundistas, the wealthy owners were often reluctant to give a few thousand pesos 
to promote the building of a chapel on the sugar workers' colonies while they 
donated hundreds of thousands for the building of luxurious Habana churches as 
Father Gullermo Sardiñas pointed out in an interview referring to his experiences 
in Las Villas.25 
The lack of the Church's physical presence had an aftermath in the rural 
majority's superficial identification with the values of Catholicism and even weaker 
identification with the Church as an institution. In the fifties the AGRUPACIÓN 
CATÓLICA UNIVERSITARIA, a conservative youth organization under Jesuit leader-
ship published two surveys about the religious feelings and living conditions of the 
rural population. Their data, especially the shocking statistics of the living condi-
tions, are often quoted all over the world. In this paper I use only a few index 
numbers concerning the state of affairs in religion. 
22 Betto, Frei: Fidel y la Religión. Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, La Habana, 1985, 
p. 101. . 
23 Portuondo, Yolanda: Guillermo Sardiñas. El Sacerdote Comandante. Ed. Cultura Popular, La 
Habana, 1987, p. 44. 
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According to the 1954 survey 96.5% of those interviewed believed the exis-
tence of God and a national average of 72.5% declared themselves to be Catho-
lics. But only 24 percent of the Catholics visited Mass regularly, 42 percent went 
only occasionally. 31 percent visited Church now and then in a couple of years. 
But very different are the index numbers characterizing the religious feelings of 
the rural population. In rural areas, only 52 percent of those interviewed declared 
themselves to be Catholics, whereas 41 percent declared themselves "indifferent" 
as to "religious affiliation". 
Statistics slightly differ in different studies but they all show the same tenden-
cy: the very low level of practicing religion. 88-93.5 percent of rural family heads 
had never attended Mass. More than 53 percent of rural workers interviewed 
declared that they had never seen the parish priest of their district. This group 
included 27.3 percent of the Catholic peasants, too. 91 percent of the children 
were baptized but only a meagre 16 percent attained to church marriage. Only 3 
or 4 percent trusted in the Church's activities to improve the conditions of agricul-
tural workers.24 
The Catholic Church of the first half of the 20ieth century had an élitist 
mentality. It has been mentioned that in the "neocolonial republic" the Church 
regarded the upper classes of society, the leading groups of economic and political 
life and the urban middle class as the rock giving her a firm stand. What means 
were in her possession to win these circles, to gain their respect and their financial 
support, to influence their opinions? 
School was far more important than church in this situation. From the early 
years of the century the network of Catholic elementary and secondary schools 
and colleges expanded at a good pace. The majority of them were run by monastic 
orders. In 1914 there were only 55 Catholic colleges in Cuba; in 1955 their num-
ber was 212 and they had 61.960 students.25 It is not an overstatement that these 
church schools brought up and let out the social and intellectual élite of the 
24 Quoted by Marimón, Mateo Jover: "The Cliurch" in Cannelo Mesa-Lago ed. Revolutianory Change 
in Cuba. Pittsburgh, 1974, pp. 400-401.; see too Kirk: Ante, el Volcán..., ed. cit. pp. 75-76. 
25 Treto op. cit. p. 22. 
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country. The Jesuit schools were especially famous for the high level of education. 
In theory school fees were not very high. We are informed by Fidel Castro that in 
the early 40ies in Colegio Belén (Betlehem College) of Habank which was regar-
ded the most élitist college of the country, boarders payed about 50 dollars per 
month.26 But in practice private school fees (even those of cheeper elementary 
schools) were inaccessible for the children of the low-income majority. 
The strategical importance of education is signified by the fact that a greater 
percentage of church staff worked in and for it than in the parishes. 
In 1955 90 percent of monks not ordained (299) were teaching and one third 
of ordained monks (1.53 out of 461) worked in education as well. In like manner 
education was the vital part of the activities of sisterhoods, 1167 nuns out of 1872 
worked as teachers. Between 1946 and 1959 three Catholic private universities 
were founded by the Augustine Order, the Jesuits and the La Salle Brothers. The 
Saint Tliomas of Villanueva University run by the Augustine Order counted ca. 
1000 students coming from the wealthiest families of the country.27 
Reorganized congregations, religious associations, secular Catholic societies 
with the bulk of middle-class members becamc another field to gain influence. 
Keeping to the spirit of the social doctrine of Pope Pius XI. the majority of these 
organizations were active in charity work under the "New-Christianity" slogan of 
re-christ iani / .at ion soc ie ty . T h e CABALLEROS CATÓLICOS ( 1 9 2 5 ) , t h e FEDERACIÓN 
DE J U V E N T U D E S CATÓLICAS ( 1 9 2 8 ) , the AGRUPACIÓN CATÓLICA UNIVERSITA-
RIA (1931) can be mentioned. By 1943 the four sections of the ACCIÓN CATÓLICA 
were fully developed. By the fifties the new youth organisations specialized mainly 
on students and intellectuals inside the Acción Católica (JUVENTUD UNIVER-
SITARIA C A T Ó L K : \ , J U V E N T U D ESTUDIANTIL CATÓLICA e tc . ) . 
The rich choice of church journals and periodicals served also as means to win 
the middle-class and the political-economical élite.2" 
26 Bet to op. cit. p. 141. 
27 Trcto op. cit. p. 22.; Kirk op. cit. p. 74. 
2S SEE: Lciscca op. cit. p. ZV7. 
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The Church strategy proved to be succesful in the last analysis. As John M. 
Kirk points out, in the fifties it was fashionable in the leading circles to be a 
Catholic. The major daily papers e.g. conservative Diario de la Marina reflected 
this when they started separate columns for Church news and spred Church opini-
on on social and cultural problems.29 
In the republic era the Church attached herself to the power as a "sleep 
partner" and only occasionally touched politics until the 40ies. She had not formed 
a standpoint of her own in the principial social, political, national problems in-
triguing the public. She kept quiet about the USA interventions, the Machado 
dictatorship, the suppression of the 1933-35 revolution, etc. From the 40ies the 
Church and the connected Catholic organizations got slowly engaged in politics, 
adopting the anticommunist mentality of Pope Pius XII. After World War II the 
Church joined the policy of Cold War, attacking above all the People's Socialist 
Party i.e. the communists in her statements. 
The role of the Church and the Catholics in the struggle against Batista in the 
pre-revolutionary period is a highly controversial question. I judge most outstand-
ing the deed of MONS. P É R E Z SERANTES, the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba 
who interceded personally on behalf of Fidel Castro and thus saved his life after 
the failure of the attack against the Moneada barraks. He was lead by humanita-
rian intentions not by political considerations. 
The Church as institution tried to retain her neutrality and stay out of the 
conflict between dictator and nation even after the guerilla war broke out. But the 
worth of this behaviour was diminished by the widely known excellent personal 
relationship between Cardinal Manuel Arteaga, Archbishop of Habana, and the 
dictator. This fact suggested the appearance of legitimity of Batista's rule. From 
the beginning of 1958 in Church circles discussions started and went on concerning 
the future of the country. 
There were Bishops who proposed that the Church should initiate making 
Batista resign. This proposal was broken down by the conservatism and hesitation 
of the bishopric corporation. Officially the Church did nothing against Batista. 
?') Kirk op. cit. p. 77. 
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The silence of the Church, the prelates' policy of waiting reflected the uncer-
tainties and hesitations of the middle-class which was the principal social basis of 
the Church but this silence can't be called the standpoint of the total of active 
believers. The very same middle class, the groups of socially and politically respon-
sive intellectual youth gave the bulk of those Christians who consciously undertook 
the anti-Batista struggle. The majority of them took part in urban resistence but a 
great number took up arms and was fighting in the guerilla war. An outstanding 
representative of these groups was JOSÉ ANTONIO ECHEVERRÍA, the martyred 
Catholic leader of the fighting Habana students. Protestant FRANK PAÍS was the 
second man of July 26 Movement until his death in 1957. The fermentation inside 
the clergy can be illustrated by the example of the life of father GUILLERMO 
SARDINAS. He joined Castro's guerillas as early as 1957 and went up to the Sierra 
Maestra. Though he did not take up arms and he worked as army chaplain his 
behaviour was of great political importance and made enormous impression on 
public opinion. The revolutionary government acknowledged his merits by giving 
him the highest military rank of the day: he was promoted comandante. In the last 
phase some moderate and even politically conservative Catholic groups like that of 
MANUEL ARTIMÉ joined the armed fight against Batista. 
Names and examples could be multiplied. Fidel Castro also acknowledged 
several times that Cuban Catholics had resolutely supported the case of freedom. 
I put greater emphasis on the phenomenon that until 1959 ideological factors 
like the problem of religiousness or atheism played a secondary role in the 
struggle against dictatorship. Being convinced of the illegitimity of the dictatorship 
which had come to power by military coup, brought forth a temporary political 
concord among people with widely raging world views. The July 26 Movement 
itself was not homogenous in this aspect. It functioned as a special 'collective and 
collecting party' in which various ideological and political tendencies were living 
together in the years of struggle. Differentiation and separation showed themselves 
only after the victory in the debates about the new social and political order. 
The best known and elaborated phase of the history of Cuban Catholicism has 
been the last three decades. It seems pointless in this short paper to repeat facts 
56 
The Church and the Social Challenges in Modern Cuba 
and events exposed and surveyed by others. In the conclusion I point out only 
some relevant tendencies and connections of the subject. 
The period is marked by the painful proceeding from conflict to the beginning 
of dialogue in the relationship of Church and a State based on socialist-communist 
principles. In his objective and factual book - La Iglesia Católica durante la Con-
strucción del Socialismo en Cuba - Cuban Catholic author RAÚL GÓMEZ TRETO 
distinguishes five inner phases in the course of shaping Church and State relation-
ship: dissension (1959-60), confrontation (1961-62), evasion (1963-67), encounter 
(1968-69) and dialogue (1979-85).30 Other authors use basically similar periodisa-
tions though slight differences can be discerned as well. 
According to Mateo Jover Marimón, the Church opened towards dialogue as 
early as 1969.31 John M. Kirk holds the view that 1969 witnessed only "Emerging 
from Cocoon" and the Church got from 'Modus vivendi to Dialogue' between 
1980-85.32 
Whatever periodisation is applied the role and position of Church was decided 
and defined by the confrontation of the first years. Dominated by pre-Synod 
mentality the Church was prepared neither politically nor intellectually for the 
radical and rapid social and political changes developing from the beginning of 
1959. In this situation her leaders made a strategical mistake when in spite of 
lacking program and proper political experience and miscalculating their power 
and social influence they undertook to act on behalf of the desorganized bour-
geoisie. The full growth of the conflict was urged by the bishops anticipating 
communist danger - which after all proved to be true - in their declarations and 
pastoral letters.33 Some believers and clerics used not only intellectual weapons 
but changed churches, schools, church buildings and other institutions in general 
30 Treto op. cit. p. 26. 
31 Marim6n op. cit. p. 403. 
32 Kirk, John M.: 'Between God and the Party. The Church in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1985.': 
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Vol. XI. No. 21 (1986), pp. 93-109. 
33 E.g. the "Pastoral Letter from the Cuban Episcopate" of August 7, 1960, criticized the rise of com-
munism in Cuba. Quoted by Treto op. cit. pp. 35-37. 
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into stages of political conspiration. On this account Catholics on the whole be-
came suspected of being counter-revolutionaries and the revolutionary govern-
ment, shifting rapidly leftwards, naturally took repressive measures. In the days of 
the Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs) invasion the security forces occupied church buil-
dings and executed preventive arrestments. In summer 1961 the nationalisation of 
private schools struck ¿ heavy blow on the mental influence of the Church and on 
her finances as well. The conflict culminated in September 1961 when the govern-
ment sent a bishop and 131 priests into exile. Later several clerics were impriso-
ned charged with counter-revolutionary activities.34 
The period of confrontation was not a conflict of faith and atheism. It was a 
definitely political antagonism in which the social conservatism and dogmatic 
anticommunism of Church faced the improvized church policy of revolutionary 
intransigence. As an outcome the Church lost her social positions built up in the 
former decades. In a short time the majority of active believers and supporters 
emigrated. The bourgeoisie as social basis proved to be quicksand instead of firm 
rock. The emigration of the masses of foreign priests and monks endangered even 
the normal everyday functions of the Church. The majority (460 persons) chose 
voluntary emigration instead of keeping the priest's calling in the difficult situa-
tion. The total number of clergy had stabilized by the mid-sixties a little above 
200. A similar number of social-worker nuns (nursing elderly and sickly people) 
had stayed in the country. 
In the period of confrontation Cuban Catholic Church was being tempted by 
the hamartia of Greek tragedies. Her tragic flaw was to have secular aims com-
pletely differing from and even opposing to the short-distance interests of the 
people, her true potential basis. 
Since the 1959 Revolution both Church and Cuban reality have undergone 
considerable changes. There has developed a society with basically atheist educa-
tion and monolithic political structure but with the surviving presence of Christian 
traditions and cultural values. Focusing on the idea of moral responsibility for 
progress the Church has been re-formulating the principles of her social mission 
34 Treto op. cit. p. 48., pp. 58-59. 
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from the early-seventies. Two pastoral letters of the Bishops' Conference signified 
the opening in 1969 ("Cuban Bishops Call for End of Trade Blockade", "On Con-
temporary Atheism") while the climax set in with the mentality embodied in the 
Final Document of 1986 National Church Encounter (ENCUENTRO NACIONAL 
ECLESIAL CUBANO). This important document leaves no doubt that the Church 
has revised her historical role, had adopted the main Latin-American results of 
the Catholic aggiornamento and as a supporter and mild critic of socialist develop-
ment she won respect in spite of the small member of believers, estimated 75-100 
thousand in the 80ies. 
The consolidation of her prestige has been supported by the strengthening of 
Latin-American Catholic progressives, which from the late 70ies several times has 
prompted Cuban party leadership propound the possibility of strategical alliance 
between communists and Christians.35 
But in Cuba herself achieving such a "new tie" - as suggested by the Final 
Document of the ENEC as well - demands a lengthy dialogue and the settlement 
of unsolved problems. 
35 See e.g.: Programa del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Ed. Política, La Habana, 1986, p. 187.; Resolu-
ciones Aprobados por el II Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Ed. Política, 1981, p. 57.; 
Betto op. cit., etc. 
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A Z E G Y H Á Z É S A T Á R S A D A L M I KIHÍVÁSOK 
A M O D E R N K U B Á B A N 
A tanulmány azokat a főbb társadalmi kihívásokat tekinti át, elemzi, amelyekkel a katolikus 
egyháznak szembe kellett néznie a "modern időkben": a 19. sz. második felétől napjainkig. Megálla-
pítja, hogy az egyház befolyásának csökkenése és a vallás térvesztése nem pusztán az 1959-es for-
radalom következménye. Kuba a 20. században Latin-Amerika legkevésbé vallásos országa. 
Ennek egyik fő oka, hogy a 19. sz. második felében a gyarmati egyház a spanyol érdekekkel 
azonosult, elutasította a függetlenségi törekvéseket. A századfordulón, a függetlenség elnyerése idején 
sokan elfordultak az egyháztól, mint "idegen" intézménytől. Az egyház térvesztésének másik alapvető 
oka, hogy nem tudott megfelelni annak a kihívásnak, amit a rabszolgák evangelizálása vetett fel, 
tovább éltek az afrikai kultuszok, illetve katolikus elemekkel átszőtt szinkretikus vallásosság alakult ki, 
amely ma is jellemzi a lakosság tekintélyes hányadát. 
Az ún. "újgyarmati köztársaság" évtizedeiben az egyház a középrétegeket tekintette fő bázisának, 
befolyását elsősorban a magániskolák, a világi katolikus egyletek és a katolikus sajtó révén növelte. 
"Elfeledkezett" viszont a lakosság döntő többségét alkotó szegényekről, különösen a vidék szegényei-
rfíl. 
A legnagyobb kihívás századunkban az 1959-es forradalmat követő gyors társadalmi és politikai 
átalakulás volt az egyház számára, amellyel múltja és Zsinat előtti konzervativizmusa miatt képtelen 
volt azonosulni. Az állam és az egyház közötti konfliktus a hatvanas évek elején működési terének, 
befolyásának beszűkülését eredményezte. A ma egyháza nehéz körülmények között, és fájdalmas 
\ tapasztalatok árán jutott el társadalmi szerepének újrafogalmazásához. 
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